



DE FACTO PRISON FOR ADDICTS?
This note discusses the history and status of California's statutory
plans for coping with the narcotic addiction problem.
I. BACKGROUND
Opium has the distinction of being probably the oldest known
narcotic and may compete with alcohol for the title of the oldest
known sedative drug-use of opium is referenced as far back as
5000 to 4000 B.C. In its unrefined state it was used for thousands
of years as an analgesic, a tranquilizer, a sedative and a way of
escaping reality. In 1804 a chemist discovered that crude opium
actually consisted of several different chemicals, and isolated the
principal active ingredient-morphine. It was not until 1898 that
an associated drug, heroin, was discovered. At that time heroin was
believed to be non-addicting.' It was later discovered that all opiate
derivatives, such as morphine, heroin, dilaudid, codeine, and dionin,
are both physiologically and psychologically addicting.
The natives of the New World knew the effects of another drug,
a stimulant, which they experienced by chewing coca leaves. The
drug cocaine was first produced from these leaves in 1853. Though
it acts differently than the opiate derivatives, being a stimulant rather
than a depressant, it too is considered to be physiologically and
psychologically addicting. Marijuana, on the other hand, is not con-
sidered physiologically addicting, and it is the only narcotic defined
in the California Health and Safety Code whose users are specifically
exempt from narcotic addict commitment.' Barbiturates and am-
phetamine-type stimulants are not narcotics and no provision is
made for their users to be included under the California Narcotic
Rehabilitation Act.'
The Harrison Narcotic Act4 of 1914, although a federal revenue
act, had a regulatory effect on narcotics. It was passed at a time
when the narcotic problem in the United States existed to a degree
that would be shocking today. In 1914 it was estimated that there
were between 150,000 and 200,000 narcotic addicts in the United
1 CAL. Crrinzs' ADvIsORY CownMMTo T H ATToRNEY GmunmA ON Cxnu
PREVENTION, NAnconc ADDICTION, p. 9 (March 26, 1954).
CAL.. PEN. CODE § 6407.
s STATS. 1961, ch. 850, §§ 2, 3.
4 38 STAT. 785.
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States. In 1918, a commission appointed by the Secretary of the
Treasury estimated that there were 1,000,000 drug addicts in the
country. During World War I, one man in every 1,500 was re-
jected from military service because of drug addiction.' These fig-
ures should be contrasted with the estimate that in 1954 there were
60,000 addicts in the nation, and in World War I the army rejected
one man in every 10,000 because of drug addiction.' Prior to the
1914 passage of the Harrison Act, narcotic drugs could be bought
for pennies over the counter because there was no illicit market
and no abnormal profit in these drugs. Ten years later, the esti-
mated incidence of drug addiction had dropped to approximately
one-eighth the 1914 rate.'
The major effects of opium addiction on afflicted persons are in-
terference with (1) their productivity, (2) their desire for achieve-
ment, (3) their sense of responsible adjustment to vocational, fam-
ily and social problems and (4) their heterosexual adjustment.'
Because of these effects society began to realize that it had a moral
duty and right to suppress drug addiction, both to protect itself and
to prevent the individual from harming himself.' These factors led
to the passage of additional legislation, including the declaration in
1924 that heroin was an illegal drug. Since 1924 there has been
no legal importation of heroin into the United States.1" Other opi-
ates are manufactured under license of the federal government for
medical use.
California has sporadically enacted legislation regulating narcot-
ics. For instance, administering stupifying drugs with the intent to
commit a felony was prohibited in 1872," keeping or resorting to a
place where opium was used was declared unlawful in 1881,1" taking
opium into a jail became a crime in 1901," being an addict was
defined as vagrancy in 1929,"4 and in 1931 the Chief and Inspectors
of the Division of Narcotic Enforcement became peace officers of
the State of California.' 5
5 ADvisony Coiai., op. cit. supra note 1, at 14.
0 Id., at 14, 15.
7 KOLB & Du MEz, T EPvALE c AND TnEND OF DRUG ADDICTION 3n z
UNTEuD STATES AND FACTOnS INFLUENCING IT. Reprint 924, Public Health
Reports (1924).
8 Medical Views on the Narcotics Problem, 31 F.R.D. 53, 60 (1963).
9 Ibid.
10 Avisony Comm~r., op. cit. supra note 1, at 20.
11l CAL. PEN. CODE § 222.
12 CAL. PEN. CODE § 307, repealed by STATS. 1937, ch. 382, § 1.
13 CAL. PEN. CODE § 171a.
14 CAL. PEN. CODnE § 647 (12), repealed by STATS. 1939, ch. 1078, § 1.
15 CAL. PEN. CODE § 817.
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In 1927 California enacted a comprehensive system for the treat-
ment of addicts in hospitals."0 In 1937 this system was codified into
the Welfare and Institutions Code."7 The code permits the civil com-
mitment of a person determined to be a "narcotic drug addict." The
term "narcotic drug addict" is defined as "any person who habitually
takes or otherwise uses to the extent of having lost the power of
self-control any opium, morphine, cocaine, or other narcotic drug.
*""8 Section 5355 provides that upon determination that a per-
son is a narcotic drug addict, he may be committed to the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene for placement in a hospital "for an inde-
terminate period of not less than three months nor more than two
years."
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5355.7 provides that "(a) ny
person committed as a drug addict . . . may be paroled after the
expiration of three months . . ." or paroled "after the expiration of
three months and before the expiration of the maximum term...
when such superintendent [of the hospital] is satisfied that the per-
son will not receive substantial benefit from further hospital treat-
ment."
Few addicts committed under these Welfare and Institutions
Code provisions receive any treatment. This is because the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene in practice accepts only those persons who
voluntarily commit themselves"9 and because of lack of personnel
and facilities.
With passage of the Health and Safety Code in 1939, California
placed emphasis upon regulation, and today Division X of that code
entitled "Narcotics" contains provisions regarding definitions, offenses
and enforcement.
Prior to 1962 several California counties relied on section 11721
of the Health and Safety Code as the primary control for their
narcotic addict populations. This section made it a misdemeanor for
any person within the state's jurisdiction to use, or be under the
influence of, or be addicted to the use of, narcotics unless adminis-
tered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the state.
As a part of the penalty, the section provided for a ninety-day man-
datory period of custody upon conviction, which could be imple-
mented by various rehabilitative and supervisory services.
16 STATS. 1927, ch. 89.
'1 STATS. 1937, ch. 369.
18 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350. Other narcotic drugs are defined in div.
10, ch. 2, art. 1, HEALT & SAF= CoDE.
19 CAL. SPEcmIA STuDY CoinN N NAconcs, FINAL REPOnT, p. 21 (1961).
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A Citizens' Advisory Committee to the Attorney General on Crime
Prevention recommended that new legislation be sought in this
field.2" At the 1961 regular session of the California Legislature
such a bill was considered, and subsequently Chapters 11 and 12
of the Penal Code, entitled "Commitment and Corrective Treatment
of Narcotic Addicts" and "California Rehabilitation Center" (here-
inafter referred to as Narcotic Rehabilitation Act) passed and be-
came law September 15, 1961.21
In 1962 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional,
in Robinson v. California, that portion of section 11721 of the
Health and Safety Code which permitted conviction for the status
of being addicted, as differentiated from the acts of using or being
under the influence of narcotics. This gave considerable impetus to
the new Narcotic Rehabilitation Act which had been in effect only
months prior to the Supreme Court decision. Hundreds of commit-
ments under the new act had been made prior23 to the Robinson
decision, and even more have been made since. The new compre-
hensive plan for treatment has withstood constitutional attack in the
California courts on several occasions and the United States Supreme
Court has refused to review a California Supreme Court decision,
In re De La ,24 upholding the constitutionality of the Narcotic
Rehabilitation Act.
11. CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY PLAN
A. General
The Narcotic Rehabilitation Act (Penal Code Chapters 11 and
12) emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation of the narcotic addict
in a specialized institution rather than his mere prison confinement.
Nevertheless involuntary confinement is part of the plan. The avowed
purpose of the act is nonpunitive treatment for the protection of
the individual and the public.2"
The following summary of the provisions of Chapter 11 demon-
strates the rehabilitative character of the program and details the
procedures involved in admitting a person to treatment.
This chapter provides generally for "receiving, control, confine-
ment, employment, education, treatment and rehabilitation of per-
sons under the custody of the Department of Corrections or any
20 ADViSORY Corona., op. cit. supra note 1, at 40.
21 STATS. 1961, ch. 850, §§ 2, 3.
22 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23 CAL. DEP'T. OF CommTIONS, CALIFOmIA. NAnconcs ADDICT CONTROL &
RmHAB=I'rATION PROGRAm: A REvIEw, p. 7, (Jan. 15, 1962).
24 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P. 2d 793, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
25 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6399.
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agency thereof who are or have been addicted to narcotics or who
by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of
becoming addicted."26 A "'(n) arcotic addict' as used in this chapter
refers to any person . . . who is addicted to the unlawful use of
any narcotic as defined in Division 10 of the Health and Safety
Code27, except marijuana."2 The phrase "imminent danger" is not
defined in either Penal Code Chapter 11 or 12, but the wording
of section 6400, "or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are
in imminent danger of becoming addicted" seems to indicate that
use, presumably unlawful, is the criterion for determining if a per-
son is in imminent danger, rather than, for example, his mere as-
sociation with known addicts.
The specific commitment procedures set out in Chapter 11 vary
according to whether the person sought to be committed is charged
with a crime29 or whether he is not so charged."0 There are also
variations according to whether the person is charged in a municipal
or justice court," or in a superior court.32
B. Involuntary Commitment of Persons Convicted of a Crime
1. In Municipal or Justice Court
Section 6450 of the Penal Code provides that if, upon conviction
of a crime in a municipal or justice court, it appears to the judge
that the defendant may be addicted or in imminent danger of be-
coming addicted to narcotics, such judge shall adjourn the proceed-
ings or suspend imposition of the sentence and certify the defendant
to the superior court. The superior court then conducts proceedings
to ascertain if such defendant is addicted or is in imminent danger
of becoming addicted to the use of narcotics. These proceedings are
conducted in substantial compliance with sections 5353, 5053, 5054
and 5055 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The proceedings
include arraignment, medical examination, and hearing.
If the superior court judge finds that the defendant is addicted,
or is in immient danger of becoming addicted to narcotics, and is
not ineligible for the program under section 6452 of the Penal
26 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6400.
27 CAL. HEALTH & SAFET CODE 99 11001, 11002, 11002.1, 11003, 11003.1.
These sections contain a voluminous list of narcotics, including opium, her-
oin, cocaine, morphine, codeine and derivatives.
28 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6407.
29 CAL. PEN. CODE §9 6450-4.
30 CAL. PEN. CODE §9 6500-10.
3: CAL. PEN. CODE § 6450.
32 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6451.
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Code, or there is an exception to the applicability of that section,"m
the judge shall make an order committing the defendant to the
custody of the Director of Corrections. Such commitment is for a
minimum of six months,"4 and a maximum of seven years, unless an
extension is granted, 5 and if so granted, the maximum shall not
exceed ten years."6
If the defendant is dissatisfied with the commitment order, he
may demand a hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 5125, before a judge or jury." This hearing is the last resort
at the trial level and if the determination of addiction is affirmed,
the defendant is committed forthwith.
Where the defendant is not found to be addicted or in imminent
danger of becoming addicted, he is certified back to the municipal
or justice court for further proceedings deemed warranted by the
judge of that court.
2. In Superior Court
Penal Code section 6451 sets forth the commitment procedure
after the defendant's conviction of a crime in the superior court.
Upon conviction, unless the superior court judge is of the opinion
that the defendant's record and probation report indicate such a pat-
tern of criminality that he is not a fit subject for the rehabilitation
program, criminal proceedings are adjourned or imposition of sen-
tence is suspended. Commitment proceedings are undertaken in es-
sentially the same manner as if originating in a municipal or justice
court.
The municipal and justice court judges, however, seem not to
have been given the discretion to decide whether the defendant is
a fit subject for the rehabilitation program. If it appears to the mu-
nicipal or justice court judge that the defendant may be addicted or
in imminent danger of addiction to narcotics he is bound to adjourn
proceedings or suspend imposition of sentence in the criminal action
and certify the defendant to superior court. Thus, it would appear
33 In 1963, the legislature amended § 6450 by adding a provision for com-
mitment notwithstanding § 6452. Stats. 1963, ch. 1706, § 7. Thus, in "unusual
cases, wherein the interest of justice would best be served, the judge may,
with the concurrence of the district attorney and defendant," order commit-
ment despite conviction for a crime enumerated in § 6452.
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6516.
" CAL. PEN. CODE § 6521.
38 Ibid. Prior to 1963, a person committed under § 6450 was committed for a
eriod of five years, except as earlier discharge was permitted by PEr. CODE
. 11. The effect of the 1963 amendment, under § 6521, is to increase the
period of allowable confinement under § 6450 to seven, and, possibly, ten
years. There has been no change permitting discharge prior to six months.
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6508.
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that a more selective process is employed for defendants convicted
of crimes in the superior court. This distinction is apparently based
upon the fact that a crime tried in the superior court is usually of a
more serious nature than a criminal offense tried in a municipal or
justice court. On this basis alone, the greater discretion vested in
the superior court judge seems justified.
3. Return From Commitment
After commitment a defendant may be returned to the convicting
court if, after 60 days following receipt of the defendant at the
facility, the Director of Corrections concludes that, because of ex-
cessive criminality or for other relevant reason, the defendant is not
a fit subject for confinement and treatment under the program."8
C. Involuntary Commitment of Persons Not Charged
With a Crime
Penal Code Chapter 11, Article 3, sets up a civil commitment
procedure for persons not charged with a crime, but addicted or in
imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics. This procedure
is more elaborate than that employed after criminal conviction for,
in the case of a person not charged with a crime, commitment is
a deprivation of liberty which could not otherwise be imposed.
Penal Code section 6500 provides that anyone who believes that
a person is addicted, or is in imminent danger of becoming addicted
due to repeated use of narcotics, may report such belief to the district
attorney who may petition the superior court for commitment of such
person to the custody of the Director of Corrections for confinement
in the narcotics rehabilitation facility. (Penal Code section 6501
declares it to be a misdemeanor knowingly to contrive to have a
person unlawfully adjudged an addict.)
Upon the filing of the petition by the district attorney, the su-
perior court issues its order that such person be medically examined
pursuant to section 5050.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.3"
A copy of the petition filed by the district attorney and a copy
of the court's examination order must be personally delivered to the
person sought to be committed at least one day prior to the time
fixed by the court for the medical examination.40 The court may
also order the person confined in a county hospital or other suitable
institution pending a hearing if the district attorney's petition is ac-
companied by the affidavit of a physician alleging an examination
88 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6453.
s9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6502.
40 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6503.
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by him within three days prior to the filing of the petition, conclud-
ing that the person, unless confined, is likely to injure himself or
others or become a menace to the public. Where one is so ordered
to be confined, it is the duty of the person in charge of the institution
to provide medical aid to ease any symptoms of withdrawal from
the use of narcotics. 1
After the medical examination is completed a report thereof is
delivered to the court. If no addiction or imminent danger of ad-
diction is found, the petition is dismissed and the person, if confined,
is released.42 If addiction, or imminent danger of addiction, is re-
ported by the examining physician, the court sets the time and place
for a commitment hearing and gives the person sought to be com-
mitted notice thereof.4" The hearing may be waived by the person
sought to be committed, by an expression to this effect in open
court.44 The court, if a hearing is not waived, may issue subpoenas
to insure the presence of witnesses at the hearing, and the person
sought to be committed has a right to have witnesses subpoened, to
counsel, to present witnesses on his behalf and to cross-examine wit-
nesses.45 If he is financially unable to employ counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel if so requested.46 Although there is no express
statutory declaration to the effect that the judge is required to advise
the person of this right to court appointed counsel,41 the tenor of
the overall commitment procedure as outlined by the California Su-
preme Court in the In re De La 0 decision indicates that this is
required4
At the hearing, if it is determined that the person is not addicted,
the petition is dismissed.
If found addicted, he is committed to the custody of the Director
of Corrections for an indeterminate period of not less than six
months" nor more than ten years.5" If the person committed, or a
friend in his behalf, is dissatisfied with the commitment order, he
may demand a hearing by judge or jury in substantial compliance
41 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6502.
42 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6504.
43 Ibid.
44 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6507.
45 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6505.
- Ibid.
47 But cf., Ca.. PEN. CODE § 858.
48 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P. 2d 793, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
49 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6516.
60 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6521. Prior to the 1963 amendment of § 6506, the maximum
period of confinement was five years. The 1963 amendment does not impair
the legality or effectiveness of any order made or other action taken that was
lawful when taken. STATs. 1963, ch. 1706, § 17.
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with the provisions of section 5125 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.51
Under the commitment procedures set out above, a committed
person may, in the absence of a criminal conviction, be discharged
from the program if the Director of Corrections concludes that he
is not a fit subject for treatment."
In summary, it should be noted that there are two requirements
which must be satisfied before it is possible to commit to the re-
habilitation program a person not charged with a crime but believed
to be addicted, or in imminent danger of becoming addicted to nar-
cotics. First, the medical examination must show addiction or at least
an imminent danger of addiction to narcotics. Second, this condition
must be demonstrated to the court's satisfaction at a formal hearing
where the person has a right to representation by counsel. In addi-
tion, if the person is committed and is dissatisfied, he may demand
a judge or jury trial to review the commitment order. A finding of
non-addiction at this point will result in a dismissal regardless of
the prior findings.
D. Release From Rehabilitation Program
1. Outpatient Status
After commitment to the rehabilitation program under any of
the above sections, a six-month period of confinement and observa-
tion is mandatory. Subsequently, the individual may become eligible
for release to outpatient status. When, in the opinion of the Director
of Corrections, the person has recovered sufficiently to warrant release
to outpatient status, the director certifies this fact" to the Narcotic
Addict Evaluation Authority.54 If the director has not so certified a
case within the preceding twelve months, in the anniversary month
of commitment, the case is automatically referred to the authority
for consideration of the advisability of release to outpatient status.5"
The authority may release the person to outpatient status, subject
to (1) the rules and regulations of the authority, (2) all conditions
imposed by the authority, and (3) recommitment to inpatient status
51 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 6508.
52 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6509.
53 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6516.
54 The Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority is composed of three members
who, insofar as it is practicable, shall have broad backgrounds in law, so-
ciology, law enforcement, medicine, or education and shall have a deep in-
terest in the rehabilitation of narcotic addicts. The authority has as its head-
quarters the California Rehabilitation Center, and meets as is necessary, for
a full and complete study of all persons certified by the Director of Correc-
tions as having recovered to such an extent that outpatient status is war-
ranted. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 6515.
55 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6516.
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as prescribed in such rules, regulations or conditions. The Depart-
ment of Corrections is responsible for supervision of a person re-
leased to outpatient status. Such person may be closely supervised
through periodic and surprise testing for narcotic use and through
counseling. 6 In connection with outpatient release, the Director of
Corrections may establish halfway houses as pilot projects to deter-
mine the effectiveness of rehabilitation."
2. Complete Release From Rehabilitation Program
a. Release Prior to Expiration of
Maximum Commitment Period
With but one exception which requires earlier discharge,5" re-
lease from the narcotic rehabilitation program is possible after a
minimum of three years in outpatient status.5 If at any time the
Director of Corrections is of the opinion that a person, while an
outpatient, has abstained from the use of narcotics for at least three
consecutive years, and has otherwise complied with the conditions
of release, the director must report such opinion to the Narcotic
Addict Evaluation Authority for consideration."
(1) Defendant Convicted of Crime
In the case of a defendant convicted of a crime, if the authority
concurs with the opinion of the director, it may certify such de-
fendant to the committing court. That court must discharge the de-
fendant from the program and return him to the convicting court.
Criminal proceedings may be dismissed by the convicting court; if
so, the defendant is released. If criminal charges are not dismissed,
the defendant is held over for further proceedings. Time served
under the rehabilitation program is credited to the length of the
sentence imposed, if any."'
(2) Person Not Charged With Crime
In the case of a person not charged with a crime, if the authority
concurs with the opinion of the director, it must discharge such per-
son from the program."
b. Release Upon Expiration of
Maximum Commitment Period
In any case where the person committed has not been discharged
from the program prior to the expiration of the maximum period
56 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6517.
57 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6518.
58 Voluntary Commitment. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 6521.
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(seven years), such person at that time is returned to the commit-
ting court."
Unless the director recommends an extension of the confinement
period for not more than three additional years and the committing
court concurs, a person not charged with a crime must be dis-
charged."' One convicted of a crime is returned to the convicting
court. On the other hand, if the director recommends and the court
concurs in the extension, the person is retained in the program for
not more than the three additional years."
Ill. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CALIFORNIA'S NARCOTIC
REHABILITATION PROGRAM
The constitutional validity of the Narcotic Rehabilitation Program
has been challenged on several occasions in the appellate courts of
California. The program has been upheld as a legitimate exercise
of the state's power to regulate for the general health and welfare
of its inhabitants.
The leading case on this subject, In re De La 0,60 involved a
commitment to the rehabilitation facility under section 6450 of the
Penal Code (after conviction in a municipal court). De La 0 peti-
tioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus
for release from the program on the following grounds: (1) that
his commitment was a criminal penalty and, as such, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by Amendment XIV of the
United States Constitution; (2) that the terms of the code were
vague and indefinite and did not prescribe ascertainable standards of
conduct, thereby violating the due process clause of Amendment XIV
of the Constitution; and (3) that inasmuch as certain classes of
persons were denied the right of jury trial, while others were guaran-
teed this right, there was not equal protection of the law as guaran-
teed by Amendment XIV of the Constitution. 7
With respect to his argument that the program imposed cruel and
unusual punishment by subjecting narcotic addicts to a criminal pen-
alty, the petitioner relied on Robinson v. California,"8 which held
that imposition of a criminal penalty for mere narcotic addiction was
unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court carefully reviewed
63 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6521.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
6G 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P. 2d 793, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
67 Prior to the 1963 amendment of CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6450 and 6451, those
persons convicted in a municipal court of a violation of HErATH & SAFETY
CODE § 11721,and those convicted in a superior court, were not given the
right to a trial by jury.
68 370 U.S. 660.
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the code and concluded that while it exhibited a superficial criminal
character, it was, in fact, civil in nature and designed primarily to
afford treatment rather than inflict punishment.
As to petitioner's argument that the terms used in the code, par-
ticularly "addict" and "imminent danger," were vague and uncertain
and thus violative of the due process clause, the court held that the
term "addict" was sufficiently defined by section 6407 of the Penal
Code, 9 and believed that neither term was a technical word of art,
but was to be construed according to the context and approved usage
of the language. Using this rule, the court concluded that the terms
used in the code prescribed ascertainable standards of conduct and
that there was no violation of the due process clause.
The equal protection argument advanced in In re De La 0 has
lost its force due to legislative amendment of the statute in 1963.
The code now provides that all persons committed are given a right
to a jury at the hearing."0 There is no differentiation on the basis
of the type of crime of which defendant was convicted nor on the
basis of the court in which he was convicted. Even prior to the
1963 amendment, however, the In re De La 0 decision upheld the
code as constitutional.
Subsequent to In re De La 0, several cases further construed the
code provisions. These cases passed upon the validity of specific com-nitment practices utilized in particular cases.
Van Zanten v. Superior Court7" involved a venue question. The
issue was whether a petition for commitment was properly filed in
San Diego County where the person sought to be committed was
not present in the county at the time of the filing and was a resi-
dent of Los Angeles County. The court issued a writ of prohibition
restraining further commitment proceedings, and held that the per-
son sought to be committed was required to be present in the county
in which the petition was filed, at the time of filing, in order to
give the court jurisdiction. The court implied that residence in the
county might constitute constructive presence for the purpose of the
statute, but declined to make an affirmative ruling in this regard.
In re Butler72 held that the person sought to be committed was
in no position to complain of the alleged irregularity where he vol-
untarily returned to the county of filing and submitted himself to
69 The term "addict" as defined in CAL. PEN. CODE § 6407 included "in-
lawful" use of only certain narcotics. The unlawful use of marijuana, for ex-
ample, is expressly excluded from the definition.
70 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6450, 6451, 6508.
71 214 A.C.A. 540, 29 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1963).
72 59 Cal. 2d 157, 378 P. 2d 812, cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 65 (1963).
1964)
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the jurisdiction of the court. The court in Van Zanten referred to
this decision, but distinguished it on the facts.
In re Raner7 In re Johnson74 and People v, Nelson,7 discuss
problems of compliance with the statutory procedures. In each case
the person sought to be committed was confined pending hearing.
The petition for commitment was not accompanied by the affidavit
of a physician as required by Penal Code section 6502. The required
affidavit must allege an examination of such person by the affiant
within three days prior to the filing of the petition and must further
allege affiant's conclusion that, unless confined, such person is likely
to injure himself or others or become a menace to the public. Since
the statutory safeguards had been disregarded, in each case the court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the commitment order. In In re Raner
the court stated: "Being a creature of statute, jurisdiction to enter
an order of commitment pursuant thereto depends on strict cornpli-
ance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance
of the proceeding.""
People v. Juvera77 involved the question of whether the order
of commitment to the rehabilitation program was appealable. The
court held that the commitment order was appealable, and added
that the proceeding certifying the person from the convicting court
to the committing court was in the nature of an interlocutory order.
IV. RATIONALE AND DISCUSSION OF INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT FOR NARcoTIc REHABILITATION
The basis upon which the state may involuntarily confine addicts
for treatment is more easily understood by a review of parallels in
existing law.
The practice of segregation and/or confinement of persons afflicted
with mental conditions appears to have been a part of our Western
culture for hundreds of years. The stories of cruelty, neglect, and
degradation in the early English mental institutions, such as Bedlam,
are common knowledge. Few people seem to have questioned the
power of the state, both for the protection of society and for the
welfare of the insane person, or one mentally defective, to place
such a person under restraint."8 It would seem that the courts have
had no difficulty in finding justifiable the confinement of persons
73 59 Cal. 2d 635, 381 P. 2d 638 (1963).
74 59 Cal. 2d 644,381 P. 2d 643 (1963).
75 218 A.C.A. 441,32 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1963).
76 59 Cal. 2d at 639.
77 214 A.C.A. 604, 29 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1963).




dangerously insane."h At least, there seems little doubt that an in-
sane or mentally defective person may be committed to a hospital
or institution maintained for that purpose."0
The classic concept of commitment of insane or mentally defec-
tive persons is enlarged by the sexual psychopathy laws. The large
number of recidivists in sexual offenses has tended to show the in-
effectiveness of criminal punishment as correction, and in general
the sexual psychopathy laws provide for civil commitment, segrega-
tion and treatment of the persons so designated, to the end that this
recidivism may be reduced.
There are two objectives of the sexual psychopathy laws: (1) to
sequester the sexual psychopath for as long as he is a danger to
others, and (2) to treat him so that he might recover from his
condition and be released. 1 This procedure is designed for those
persons who are abnormal but not insane.82 An element of danger
in the make-up of the person to be confined is generally required.8"
Since the term of the commitment is until the person can be re-
leased safely into the general population, it must of necessity be
indeterminate.8 4 In practice this sometimes means that commitment
is the equivalent of a life sentence.85 However, this does not differ
from the commitment of insane persons, who also may be confined
for life.
In the state of Michigan the first attempt to pass a sexual psy-
chopathy law resulted in a statute providing for examination before
discharge from a penal institution of a convicted sex offender who,
"though not insane, shall appear to be a sex degenerate or a sex
pervert or appear to be suffering from a mental disorder character-
ized by marked sexual deviation, with tendencies dangerous to public
safety. .*.."" The statute provided for further incarceration of the
person in a hospital. Michigan held the statute an unconstitutional
exercise of police power as it deprived such a person of a trial by
jury of the vicinage and was not a civil commitment similar to the
case of insane persons.8 7
79 State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, 262 Pac. 970 (1927); Dixon v. Steele, 104
F. Supp. 904 (D.C. Mo. 1951); Carter v. United States, 283 F. 2d 200
(D.C. Cir. 1960); 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, § 63 (1945).
80 State ex rel. Bricker v. Griffith, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 95, 36 N.E. 2d 489 (Ct.
App. 1941); In re Stearns, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
-1 See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5512.
82 Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 350, 351 (1952).
83 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5500.
84 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5512 and BALDwIN's OHIo BET. CODE SERVICE
§ 2947.25 (1963).
88 UTAH CODE CRmI. PRoc. ANN. 77-49-5 (1953); 19 PUDxN PA. STATS.
ANN. § 1166 (Supp. 1962).
S Mica. PuB. AcTs 1937, No. 196, § 1-b.
87 People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
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A different type of statute which provided for the sterilization
of convicted sexual deviates on order of the Alabama governor was
held to lack provision for due process where the statute denied, or
failed to preserve, the right to a hearing before a competent tribunal
or board or a judicial review.8"
In 1940, however, the United States Supreme Court -upheld a
sexual psychopathy statute in the face of attack on constitutional
issues.89 State and federal courts across the nation have frequently
upheld similar statutes against claims of cruel and unusual punish-
ment,90 lack of due process,9 1 retrospective legislation, 2 ex post
facto legislation, 4 and double jeopardy."
Frequently sexual psychopaths are confined in institutions operated
by state departments of correction rather than state hospitals. The
California case law on the subject holds that confinement in an in-
stitution operated by the Department of Corrections until one re-
covers is not cruel and unusual punishment since the commitment
is not under a criminal statute. 6
However, the California statutes"T provide that the person is com-
mitted to the state entity which operates institutions for persons
mentally disturbed, rather than directly to the entity operating the
state prison system, even though the actual confinement may be in
an institution operated by the latter. 8 This differs from the Narcotic
Rehabilitation Act, which calls for direct commitment to the Direc-
tor of Corrections.99 A further distinction between the two is that
the sexual psychopathy laws ordinarily provide for a truly indeter-
minate period of confinement,' 0 whereas the Narcotic Rehabilita-
tion Act has an absolute limitation of seven years in most cases and
ten years in cases where the court has authorized an extension.1 '
There are many other parallels in the law providing for com-
mitment under civil procedures of persons variously denominated
dipsomaniacs, inebriates, or alcoholics; for persons considered defec-
88 Inre Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
89 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
O People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W. 2d 18 (1942).
91 People ex rel. Turnbaugh v. Bibb, 252 F. 2d 217 (7th Cir. 1958).
92 State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1245, 232 S.W. 2d 897 (1950).
!9 People v. Chapman, supra, note 90.
94 In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A. 2d 26 (1950).
95 In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P. 2d 159 (1951).
90 People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P. 2d 897 (1957); People v.
Gross, 139 Cal. App. 2d 607, 294 P. 2d 88, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 977, cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 793 (1956).
97 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5512, 5518.
s Ibid.
99 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6450, 6451, 6506.
100 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5512.
101 CAL. PEN. CoDE §6521.
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tive or psychopathic delinquents; for stimulant addicts; and even for
the involuntary commitment to a hospital facility of persons who
are ill with a contagious disease and who refuse to voluntarily obtain
treatment. In each case the state has found that the interests of
society demand that the rights of the individual be subjugated and
that he be confined, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, for the
benefit of society. Each of these procedures, however, is a straight-
forward civil commitment without the criminal overcast which
makes the sexual psychopathy laws and the narcotic rehabilitation
law so similar.
Critics of the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act say that it cannot be
treatment-oriented when it shows an overlay of criminal approach
to the problem. This overlay is not traceable to any one item, but
is an accumulation of small indicia which are mainly external in
their effect, and, in the opinion of the authors, are more apparent
than real. The indicia are items in the law such as: commitment of
the addict to the Director of Corrections rather than to the Director
of Mental Hygiene; placement in an institution operated by the Di-
rector of Corrections, which institution may be located on the
grounds of a California prison; staffing of the institution with De-
partment of Corrections personnel; parole of the addict to agents of
the Adult Authority having parole supervision over felons; and in-
clusion of the law in the Penal Code rather than the Health and
Safety Code or the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The claim usually heard is that these indicia show a general
scheme of criminal punishment for the status of being an addict,
thereby bringing the statutes within the purview of Robinson v'.
California.° in that such commitment of addicts as criminals con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment. A claim of cruel and unusual
punishment must depend upon a determination that the commitment
of addicts to the California Rehabilitation Center is imprisonment
as criminals, and that any treatment provided is secondary to a
punishment concept. The present law avoids this in that it denomi-
nates the procedures as nonpunitive in nature, °3 leaving it to those
attacking the law to show that it is civil in name only and provides
a de facto prison for addicts where they are treated as criminals.
The California Supreme Court has spoken of these "criminal"
indicia as "both unnecessary and unfortunate,"'0° but believed they
are outweighed by the demonstrably civil purpose of the mechanism
and operation of the program. Since the United States Supreme
102 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
•103 CAL. PEN. CODE § 6399.
104 In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d at 149, 378 P. 2d at 807.
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Court has denied certiorari in both the In re De La 0 ... and the
Btler °0 cases, it would seem that the issue is closed.
There are certain due process arguments which appear to the au-
thors to carry some weight. Foremost among these is the claim that,
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause,107 Califor-
nia's Narcotic Rehabilitation Act is vague and ambiguous, if not in
its use of the term "addicted," then certainly in the use of the phrase
"in imminent danger of becoming addicted. . . ."0' Terms such
as "imminent" by a process of creeping inclusion have a tendency
to take in more and more of the field, until they become a fiction
and there is no aspect of "imminency" remaining. Such a word as
"imminent," because it is a comparative and not an absolute, requires
a value judgment as to just how imminent is imminent. What stand-
ard is to be applied, and how can it be expressed in words that may
be communicated to the large numbers of persons involved in mak-
ing such determinations, both in the legal and the medical aspects
of the process?
A more difficult question is whether it is proper to include such
persons in an involuntary commitment program, even if the term
"imminent danger of becoming an addict" can be properly defined.
The authors know of no precedent for treating, in involuntary con-
finement, persons who are in imminent danger of becoming insane,
in imminent danger of becoming sexual psychopaths, in imminent
danger of becoming infected with a contagious disease, in imminent
danger of becoming inebriate alcoholics, or other such classification.
This appears to be a new inclusion in the laws of confinement, and
if the category can be constitutionally defined, does it come within
the police power of the state to confine persons in imminent danger
of becoming addicts?
One matter has not yet been fully tested. That is whether the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure in
criminal matters will be incorporated into the protections afforded
under the new statutory procedure for commitment of addicts. A
considerable body of law has arisen over the years in regard to what
is unreasonable search and seizure. The federal rule is now appli-
cable to the states and enforceable by habeas corpus in the federal
105 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
106 84 Sup. Ct. 65 (1963).
107 UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV § 1.
208 In the De La 0 decision the court said that "in imminent danger of becom-
ing addicted" was a non-technical phrase having a commonly understood
meaning. Since De La O was an addict the statement was dictum. See Lan-




courts.1"' This federal rule, however, applies to criminal proceed-
ings, although the vigorous rationale in People v. Cahan..° would
seem to indicate that it would be extended to cover involuntary civil
commitments.
If it be assumed arguendo that narcotic addict commitment is a
civil proceeding, then it would appear to be possible for police officers
who have made an illegal search and seizure to use the illegally
obtained evidence against the accused in the civil proceeding for
commitment as an addict even though the evidence would not be
admissible in a criminal proceeding. This type of evidence could be
extremely important in the proceeding under Penal Code section
6500, for instance, where the evidence might consist of needle
marks on an addict's arms, covered by his shirt sleeves, and disclosed
by a forcible search without reasonable cause. Even if such evidence
were reenforced by discovery of narcotics on the person of the ac-
cused, the original search being unlawful, the illegally seized nar-
cotic drug would not be admissible in a criminal proceeding. But if
the courts admit such evidence in a Penal Code section 6500 pro-
ceeding, law enforcement officers could evade the exclusionary rule
by filing, instead of a criminal charge, a petition for examination
under section 6500 of the Penal Code. Thus stated, it would appear
that it might be necessary to transplant the law of search and seizure
in toto into the laws governing the commitment of addicts.
V. CONCLUSION
Before the decision in Robinson v. California, the State of Cali-
fornia had enacted a statutory scheme for the involuntary commit-
ment of narcotic addicts. It was an original creation, not having
evolved through changes in statutory and case law. The statutes
have just undergone their first revision which has eliminated certain
objectionable aspects of the law.
Basically the law is a proper exercise of the state's police power
to protect the population from a class of persons who are sick,
and who require treatment against their will, both for their own
good and for the good of the community. It is proper that these
persons be commited to an institution where they may be involun-
tarily confined, and it is unfortunate and unnecessary, but not un-
constitutional, that there is a semblance of criminality associated
with the process. Perhaps the legislature originally was not itself
certain that it was enacting a procedure totally civil in nature, rather
than quasi-civil, quasi-criminal, but the result does not fail because
of this.
109 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
110 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
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The real defects in the system appear to lie more in the specifics
than in the generalities. At least part of the language is vague and
to some degree ambiguous. As proper cases arise, and real issues are
brought before the courts, it may be anticipated that some of these
early problems will be settled. It is expected that the legislature
will continue to improve the law. In any event, in its basic outlines,
the law has, to date, successfully withstood constitutional attack.
John L. Roche
James C. Rothwell
EFFECT OF STATE MARITAL LAWS ON "WIDOW'S"
BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
I. INTROUCTION
This note concerns one part of the voluminous Social Security
Act: Subchapter H-Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability In-
surance Benefits.1 Although the persons entitled to benefits under
this Subchapter include those who meet the requirements of wife,
child, widower, widow, or parent of the wage earner, this note is
confined to the widow's Survivors benefits2 and examines:
(1) The reference to state law to determine "widow's" status;
(2) The effect of this reference upon her right to benefits;
(3) The recent congressional amendments to the act which con-
cern the problem;3 and,
(4) The impact of state law upon the right to reinstatement of
benefits after annulment of subsequent remarriage.4
A. Nature of Benefits
The theory behind the widow's monthly benefits is the substitu-
tion of Social Security benefits for the economic loss resulting from
the death of the wage earner, thus keeping the widow from becom-
ing a public charge or undue burden upon her family.5
The right to benefits is in no way connected with need or wealth;
a widow of a wealthy man as well as a widow of a poor man may
2 49 STAT. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-25 (1958).
242 U.S.C.A. § 402 (e) (Supp. 1962). The benefits are of two types: monthly
pensions and lump-sum death payments. The lump-sum death payments are
relatively unimportant; therefore, this note is primarily concerned with the
monthly pension.
3 74 STAT. 924 (1960); 71 STAT. 519 (1957), amending 42 U.S.C. § 416
(h) (1).
4 By analogy the problems and rights of widows discussed in this note apply
to widowers as well. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(f), 416(g) (Supp. 1962).
5 See Stuart v. Hobby, 128 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Newsom v. Social
Security Board, 70 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. Mich. 1947).
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